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This paper surveys a dozen international comparative 
studies of poverty, income distribution and older 
people in industrialized countries using data up to the 
mid-1990s.  It addresses a series of questions.  At 
what level are the incomes of the elderly relative to 
the population as a whole?  How has this changed 
over the past two decades?  How many of the old are 
poor?  How many of the poor are old?  Are the oldest 
of the old poorer than younger pensioners are?   
The results show that the incomes of older people are 
typically around 80 per cent of incomes of the whole 
population.  This ratio has been increasing over the 
past two decades in most countries.  Although there 
remain pockets of poverty among the elderly, the old 
are generally represented proportionally or 
under-represented among the poor. 
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Richard Disney 
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Industrialized countries have adopted a variety of retirement-income systems.  How well 
do these different systems fare in ensuring that older people have the resources to maintain 
a decent standard of living?  And how should we measure countries’ success at achieving 
this goal? 
The cross-national analysis of income distributions is a relatively recent research 
topic, and most studies in this area have focused on the distribution of income across the 
population as a whole.  Nevertheless, it is possible to extract the results relevant to the 
economic position of older people, and we draw on a dozen such studies, typically covering 
the early and mid-1990s, to attempt a ‘meta-analysis’ of these questions.   
 The following sections look in turn at three standard measures of economic 
well-being.  Section 1 compares the average incomes of households comprising older 
people with those of the population as a whole (‘average replacement rates’).  Since 
averages can disguise a range of differences, we also disaggregate replacement rates for 
pensioners by sex, age and marital status.   
Section 2 concentrates on the bottom end of the income distribution.  It asks: 
relative to standard poverty benchmarks, how many of the old are poor?  The next section 
asks the reverse question: how many of the poor are old?  Answers to both are an essential 
input to anti-poverty and retirement-income policy.  Section 4 considers how the relative 
incomes of older people have changed over time.  Section 5 compares income-distribution 
outcomes and the features of retirement-income systems.  Section 6 looks at broader 
5 
concepts of command over resources beyond the standard measure of cash and near-cash 
incomes.  Section 7 concludes.   
An important caveat is necessary.  The procedure of examining the current income 
of pensioners and comparing them with the incomes of current workers must be used with 
care.  In a contribution-based system, today’s pensions depend on past contributions, past 
earnings and indeed the past savings behavior of today’s pensioners.  They also depend on 
the past rules of the pension system, which have changed significantly in most countries in 
the last decades.  These changes will affect the future pattern of pensioners’ incomes, and 
so current pensions may not be a good guide to the future.  Note that the most recent data 
underlying the different studies are from the mid-1990s.  Thus, recent policy reforms are 
not reflected in the results.   
 
 
 
1. The relative incomes of older people 
 The simplest measure of the relative economic well-being of older people is to 
compare their average incomes with those of the population as a whole.  Figure 1 shows 
the results of the latest income-distribution analysis compiled by the OECD on the basis of 
contributions from national experts.   
In this study, older people are defined as individuals over 65.  Incomes are 
measured on a household basis.  They are adjusted for household size using an ‘equivalence 
scale’.  Individual equivalent income is here defined as the household income divided by 
the square root of the number of household members.  (See Buhmann et al., 1988 and 
Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995 for a discussion of equivalization in a 
cross-national context.)  Since older people tend to live in smaller households, this 
adjustment boosts the measured economic well-being of older people relative to the 
population as a whole.  Income comprises earnings, public transfers, investment incomes, 
private pensions etc.  It excludes capital gains and incomes in kind (from public provision of 
health care, for example).   
 Averaging across the 15 countries, older people’s equivalent incomes are 83 per 
cent of those of the population as a whole.  Interpreting this average is quite difficult for a 
number of reasons.  For example, people no longer face the costs of work (commuting, 
special clothing etc.) when they are retired.  A replacement rate of 100 per cent would 
therefore probably reflect a sizeable increase in living standards relative to the working life.  
Younger pensioners may also derive utility from increased leisure time, particularly if the 
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requirements of their pre-retirement job prevented them from adjusting working hours to 
optimize the trade-off between work and leisure.  Increased leisure time also provides 
opportunities for home production (home improvement, cookery, gardening etc.) that 
might not have been possible before retirement.  These additions to utility are not 
measured in conventional distributional studies.   
Another important issue is the pattern of marginal utility of income with age.  For 
example, the very elderly may be unable to enjoy expensive leisure pursuits.  However, they 
may have large health and care costs, which are not taken into account.  Morbidity rates are 
much higher for older people than for the working-age population and the costs of 
disability are recognized in benefit systems.  In the United Kingdom, for example, 
recipients of disability benefits are much less likely to be in the lowest quintile of the 
population income distribution (13 per cent) than pensioners as a whole (27 per cent), 
because of their extra benefit entitlement (Department of Social Security, 2000b, Table 7.5).  
Nevertheless, it is not possible to adjust incomes for the extra cost of disability and so 
there is a danger in overstating the purchasing power of the disabled.   
 
Figure 1.  Pensioners’ incomes as a percentage of population incomes 
in 15 countries 
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Source: Förster and Pellizzari (2000), Table 2.3 
Note: data are from 1994 and 1995 with the exception of Italy (1993); income is adjusted for 
household size by dividing by the square root of the number of household members 
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 Turning to the pattern across countries, the replacement rate in this study is highest 
in North America (97 per cent in Canada and 92 per cent in the United States) and lowest 
in two Nordic countries (Denmark and Norway: 73 and 74 per cent).  Other countries are 
bunched near to the average.   
 Comparing these results with other studies is hampered by a number of 
methodological and presentational differences: for example,  
• The studies in Disney and Johnson (2001) disaggregate replacement rates by age, sex 
and marital status but do not present overall figures (nor are there population weights 
allowing one to derive the overall average); older people are defined as over 65s plus 
people aged 60-64 who are not in work; 
• Hauser (1997) presents results divided by age; older people are defined by receipt of a 
pension benefit rather than age alone; the replacement rate is calculated relative to the 
incomes of households headed by someone under age 55;  
• Disney, Mira d’Ercole and Scherer (1998) compare households where the head is aged 
circa 67 with households headed by people aged circa 55; they show results separately for 
single people and couples and do not use an equivalence scale. 
Nevertheless, the two OECD-based studies — Burniaux et al. (1998) and Förster 
and Pellizzari (2000) — can be compared directly.  They report very similar results: the 
correlation coefficient of replacement rates across the nine countries common to both 
studies is 0.98 and the means are similar.  However, both correlate very weakly with the 
earlier results of Whiteford and Kennedy (1995).   
 
1.1 The effect of sex and marital status 
 Many studies differentiate results between different age groups and between single 
and married pensioners.  These differences have obvious policy implications.  For example, 
should the pension system pay more to older pensioners than to younger?  What is the 
appropriate level of survivors’ pensions relative to the pension paid to a couple? 
Figure 2, based on Disney and Johnson (2001), splits the results by sex and 
compares single pensioners with married couples.  Typically, single women’s incomes are 
lower than those (equivalized) of married couples.  The exceptions are Italy and the 
Netherlands, a finding confirmed by Disney, Mira d’Ercole and Scherer (1998) and Hauser 
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(1997).  The latter also reports higher incomes for single women in Germany and 
Luxembourg.  In contrast, single men typically fare better than married couples.  The 
exceptions are Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, but single men’s 
incomes in these countries are only marginally lower (two to four per cent) than are 
married couples’.   
 
Figure 2.  Single pensioners’ incomes as a percentage of married couples’ 
by sex in eight countries, equivalised 
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Source:  Disney and Johnson (2001), Table 1.13 
Note: data are mainly from between 1995 and 1997, with the exceptions of Germany (1993) 
and the Netherlands (1993-94) 
 
 
 The results of replacement rates for married couples can be compared directly 
among three studies.  The pair-wise correlation coefficients vary between 0.2 and 0.6 and 
none is statistically significant.  Mean replacement rates also vary widely.  Similarly, the 
results for two studies that allow us to separate out the replacement rate for single 
pensioners provide unrelated results.   
The most convincing explanation for the patterns of incomes by sex and marital 
status is the difference in structure of social-security (public-pension) benefits.  For 
example, most continental European systems base the amount of social security wholly on 
contribution and earnings (see the descriptions of pension systems in section 5 below and 
in OECD, 2001 and Whitehouse, 2002a,b).  A consequence is that the equivalised incomes 
for married couples where one partner has an incomplete contribution history are lower 
than for single pensioners.  But the flat-benefit systems of Denmark, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom (and the means-tested system in Australia) pay a higher benefit to married 
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couples where one partner (usually the wife in the case of these cohorts) has accumulated 
little or no pension rights of her own.  This means that replacement rates for single 
pensioners are much closer to those of married couples than they are in other countries.  
Other features of retirement-income systems also have an effect on the pattern of incomes 
by sex and marital status.   
 
1.2 Living arrangements 
Disney and Johnson (2001) posit another explanation for the relatively low incomes 
of single women.  Many single female pensioners, especially those with few pension rights 
of their own, live with others.  Since the means tests for social-assistance benefits can 
depend on household incomes, these single women can have little if any entitlement to 
public transfers.  They therefore often have little income of their own.   
However, Disney and Johnson’s results, uniquely among the studies surveyed, are 
not based on household incomes.  Instead, they are based on ‘family’ or ‘income’ units, 
which consist of a single person or couple and any dependent children.  An elderly couple 
living with a grown-up child and his or her spouse count as two units under this approach, 
and their incomes are treated separately.  Results of measures of income inequality and 
poverty are quite sensitive to the choice of unit: typically, the smaller the unit of 
measurement, the larger is measured poverty and inequality.  Goodman, Johnson and 
Webb (1997), for example, report that using the family unit in the United Kingdom would 
increase the proportion of the population with incomes below half the average by a third 
compared with household-based measures.   
The effect will also vary between countries because of significant differences in the 
living arrangements of older people.  Table 1 shows the proportions of the elderly living 
with their children.  These are high in Japan and southern Europe and very low in the 
Nordic countries and the Netherlands.  In most countries, there has been a substantial 
decline in co-residence over time.  In the United Kingdom, for example, a third of the 
elderly lived with their children in the early 1960s, twice today’s level.   
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Table 1.  Proportion of over 65s living with their children 
 per cent 
Japan 65 
Italy 39 
Spain 30 
Austria 25 
France 17 
United Kingdom 16 
United States 15 
Finland 14 
Germany 14 
Norway 11 
Netherlands 8 
Sweden 5 
Denmark 4 
Note: data for various years between 1987 and 1990 
Source: OECD (1994) 
 
 
 OECD (2001) investigates the role of living arrangements in income-distribution 
outcomes in (its own words) a ‘pseudo-simulation’.  This illustrates what would happen if 
other countries were assumed to have the living arrangements of Japan or of Finland, 
keeping all other attributes of the population unchanged (Table 2).  Although this is 
implausible (because living arrangements are highly correlated with other characteristics), it 
does illustrate the possible scale of effects.  Using the example of the United Kingdom, the 
results show that original incomes would be 50 per cent higher if older people had the 
same living arrangements as in Japan and pensioners were presumed to share in the 
incomes of their adult children.  After taxes and benefits are taken into account, average 
net income would increase by 20 per cent.   
 
Table 2.  Differences in mean incomes when countries assumed to have 
the living arrangements of Japan and of Finland, 65-79 year olds, 
mid-1990s 
Changes,  Large households (Japan) Small households (Finland) 
per cent Original  
income 
After taxes 
and benefits 
Original 
income 
After taxes 
and benefits 
Canada 38 13  -11 -5 
Finland 177 18  — — 
Germany 159 9  -3 0 
Japan — —  -45 -18 
Netherlands 8 -4  -2 -1 
Sweden 16 3  -1 -1 
United Kingdom 52 20  -5 -3 
United States 25 7  -7 -4 
Source: OECD (2001), Table 2.3 
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1.3 The effect of age 
 Figure 3 shows that pensioner incomes tend to decline with age, with the 
exceptions of Canada and Australia.  Hauser (1997) also reports declining income by age 
for thirteen countries: the exception in his study is Luxembourg.  In six countries — 
Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom — the 
difference in replacement rates between 65-74 year olds and people over age 75 exceeds ten 
percentage points.  There are many explanations for this pattern.   
i) A cohort (date-of-birth) effect.  When people reach pension age, their 
benefit is determined by their past earnings, which will be higher for younger cohorts, who 
tend to have had higher real lifetime incomes than their predecessors.  
ii) Incomplete indexation of past pension benefits to inflation (especially 
private pensions and annuities).  
iii) Women live longer than men so older pensioners are disproportionately 
female.  Older women tend to be poorer than older men are. 
iv) Pension-scheme immaturity.  Where schemes are contribution-based, earlier 
contributors may not have accumulated sufficient entitlements for a ‘full’ pension.  The 
United Kingdom is one example.  The second-tier state earnings-related pension scheme 
(SERPS) was only introduced in 1978.  Benefits for successive cohorts of retirees peaked 
only in 1998 so only after twenty years or more will all pensioners have full, mature SERPS 
entitlements (for periods spent contracted in to the scheme).  
v) The role of earnings among younger pensioners.  According to the United 
Kingdom’s Department of Social Security (2000a) earnings make up nearly 60 per cent of 
the difference in incomes between recently retired single pensioners and single over 75s. 
Nevertheless, only a small minority has income from earnings: 23 per cent of couples and 
16 per cent of single pensioners among the recently retired and 15 per cent and 4 per cent 
respectively for pensioners of all ages.  The pattern of average incomes by age is therefore 
distorted by a small number of younger elderly who are still working and are relatively well 
off.   
vi) Decumulation of wealth.  If older pensioners have spent down their assets 
— as the lifecycle hypothesis would imply — then they will have lower incomes from 
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capital than younger pensioners have.  (Whether or how much this decumulation takes 
place is the subject of a long-running debate: see Disney, 1996 for a survey.) 
 However, there is one counteracting factor: differential mortality of pensioners 
across income groups.  Survivors to old ages will typically have greater financial, housing 
and pension wealth than pensioners who die young will.  This composition effect means 
that older pensioners tend to be the richer of their cohort.  Following pensioner incomes 
across time allows some of the cohort effect to be disentangled from the age effect.  
Johnson and Stears (1995) find that the average income of each cohort in the United 
Kingdom in fact increases over time.  Differential mortality offsets clear evidence of cohort 
effects, under-indexation of pension benefits and decumulation of assets.   
Australia has the reverse pattern to other countries: older pensioners are richer than 
younger ones.  This probably stems from two unique features of the Australian 
retirement-income system (on which see Bateman, Kingston and Piggott, 2001).  First, 
most private pension benefits are paid as lump sums.  Such lump sums are not counted as 
income (see section 6).  Secondly, the age pension (the public pension benefit) is both 
income- and asset-tested.  This encourages people to dissipate private-pension assets into 
housing, consumer durables etc., which do not reduce the age-pension entitlement.   
 
Figure 3.  Pensioner incomes as a percentage of non-pensioner incomes 
by age in eight countries, couples 
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Source: Johnson (1998), Table 4.2 
Note: data are mainly from between 1995 and 1997, with the exceptions of Germany (1993) 
and the Netherlands (1993-94) 
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 The following tables examine pair-wise the correlation of replacement rate rankings 
across countries for studies that divide replacement rates by age group.  There is a further 
split because Hauser reports results using ‘old’- and ‘new-OECD’ equivalence scales (in his 
terminology).  The first line in each cell shows the correlation coefficient between the 
replacement rates reported for each overlapping country in the relevant two studies.  The 
significance level, from a standard test, is reported in parentheses.  The second line in each 
cell reports the mean respective replacement rate in the two studies that are compared.  
The third line reports the number of countries that the two relevant studies have in 
common.  (Note that the means reported in each case are calculated only for the countries 
that the two relevant studies have in common.)  The final line shows the results for the 
United States.   
 Comparing the two results from Hauser, the results are highly correlated between 
countries but the mean replacement rate shifts substantially.  The correlations between the 
OECD studies for the 65-74 age group (Table 3) are fairly close, but there is much greater 
disparity in the findings of the five studies in Table 4 for older pensioners.  Although the 
means are similar, the correlations are lower, indicating that the rankings of countries by 
average replacement rates vary significantly across countries.   
 
Table 3.  Comparison matrix for replacement rates: 
age 65-74, four studies 
 Hauser (old scale) Hauser (new scale) Whiteford/Kennedy  
Förster/ 
Pellizzarri 
Correlation: 0.76 (0.01) 
Means: 87,92 
Observations: 11 
US: 99,101 
Correlation: 0.80 (0.01) 
Means: 88,86 
Observations: 10 
US: 99,95 
Correlation: 0.78 (0.01) 
Means: 89,94 
Observations: 10 
US: 99,105 
    
Hauser 
(old scale) 
 Correlation: 0.99 (0.00) 
Means: 93,86 
Observations: 12 
US: 101,95 
Correlation: 0.78 (0.01) 
Means: 95,96 
Observations: 9 
US: 101,105 
    
Hauser 
(new scale) 
  Correlation: 0.79 (0.01) 
Means: 88,97 
Observations: 9 
US: 95,105 
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Table 4.  Comparison matrix for replacement rates: 
age 75 plus, five studies 
 Hauser (old scale) Hauser (new scale) Disney/Johnson Whiteford/Kennedy 
Förster/ 
Pellizzari 
Correlation: 0.53 (0.10) 
Means: 71,98 
Observations: 11 
US: 82,98 
Correlation: 0.55 (0.09) 
Means: 78,77 
Observations: 10 
US: 82,90 
Correlation: 0.24 (0.60) 
Means: 82,82 
Observations: 7 
US: 82,83 
Correlation: 0.13 (0.74) 
Means: 80,86 
Observations: 9 
US: 82,82 
     
Hauser 
(old scale) 
 Correlation: 0.99 (0.00) 
Means: 87,78 
Observations: 12 
US: 98,90 
Correlation: 0.40 (0.45) 
Means: 87,82 
Observations: 7 
US: 98,83 
Correlation: 0.41 (0.35) 
Means: 88,89 
Observations: 9 
US: 98,82 
     
Hauser 
(new scale) 
  Correlation: 0.35 (0.38) 
Means: 79,82 
Observations: 7 
US: 90,83 
Correlation: 0.35 (0.26) 
Means: 79,89 
Observations: 9 
US: 90,82 
     
Disney/ 
Johnson 
   Correlation: 0.74 (0.04) 
Means: 81,87 
Observations: 8 
US: 83,82 
 
 
 
2. Income-poverty rates 
 ‘Poverty’ is a very broad concept and the many dimensions of social exclusion and 
deprivation can only be captured with a range of indicators.  Our focus here is on income 
as a definition of well-being.  We therefore use the term ‘poverty’ as shorthand for low 
income while acknowledging that low income as a single measure does not capture all the 
facets of poverty and deprivation. 
 There are two basic approaches to defining poverty:  
• An absolute standard: either the resources to meet basic needs or to reach the 
safety-net income specified by the social-assistance system; and 
• A relative standard, where poverty is defined in comparison with the living standards of 
society as a whole.   
Over the long term, governments have tended to increase the safety-net level of income 
faster than prices, implying that societies’ (or at least governments’) views of poverty 
changes over time.  Absolute poverty standards are problematic for international 
comparisons since: 
• Basic needs differ between countries;   
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• The poverty line must be translated into different currencies: market currency rates are 
very volatile and even purchasing power parities — which compare the cost of a 
common consumption basket — are inappropriate, because they aim to equalize the 
cost of total domestic expenditure and not the consumption of the poor; and  
• Countries’ average incomes differ.  For example, poverty rates measured against a 
threshold of 50 per cent of average consumption across the European Union varied 
from under five per cent in Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands to nearly 70 per 
cent in Portugal (Eurostat, 1990).   
The most common measure of poverty in international studies is therefore the 
proportion of the population with incomes below some ratio of the average (mean or 
median) income.  Two of the studies surveyed here define poor older people as those in 
the bottom fifth of the overall income distribution (a definition which obviously makes no 
sense when comparing aggregate poverty rates).   
Figure 4 shows the results from one of these (Johnson, 1998).  The intercept of the 
chart is drawn at 20 per cent, so that bars to the right imply that older people are 
over-represented among the poor and to the left, that they are under-represented.  In most 
countries, the proportion of older people in the bottom quintile of incomes is close to the 
‘neutral’ level of 20 per cent.  Canada shows the highest degree of over-representation.  In 
five countries, however, fewer than one in five pensioners are in the bottom quintile of the 
population income distribution.   
Figure 5 shows the same poverty measure from another OECD study.  In this 
paper, older people in all 11 countries shown are over-represented in the bottom quintile of 
the income distribution.  Most striking is the difference between the results for Australia 
and the extremely high poverty rates reported for most of the Nordic countries — 
Denmark, Finland and Norway — which typically show high replacement rates for older 
people.   
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Figure 4.  Pensioner income-poverty rates in eight OECD countries: 
percentage of elderly in the bottom quintile of the population income 
distribution 
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per cent of pensioners in bottom quintile 
of population income distribution  
Source: Johnson (1998), Table A1 
Note: uses an equivalence scale of one plus 0.7 per additional adult in an income unit and 0.5 
per additional child.  Pensioner income units are defined as all family units headed by someone 
over 65 or someone aged 60-64 who is not working.  Data are mainly from between 1995 and 
1997, with the exceptions of Germany (1993) and the Netherlands (1993-94) 
 
 
Figure 5.  Pensioner income-poverty rates in 11 OECD countries: 
percentage of elderly in the bottom quintile of the population income 
distribution 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
France
Germany
Italy
Sweden
Netherlands
US
Japan
Finland
Australia
Norway
Denmark
poverty rate
per cent of pensioners in bottom quintile 
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Source: Burniaux et al. (1998), Table 5.3 
Note: data are from 1993 to 1995 with the exception of France (1990) 
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One possible explanation is the Nordic countries’ relatively egalitarian distribution 
of income among the population as a whole compared, for example, with the United 
States.  The ratio of the value of the twentieth percentile of the income distribution to the 
median and the mean income in some example countries (from Förster and Pellizzari, 
2000, Table 2.2) illustrates these differences.  
   
Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
 
 P20/median 68% 61% 53%  
 P20/mean 62% 51% 43%  
 
Therefore, while many more pensioners in Denmark are found in the bottom quintile of 
the income distribution, their incomes will be higher as a proportion of the population 
average than low-income pensioners in the United States. 
Comparing the data in Figure 5 with Figure 4, the correlation coefficient is –0.08.  
Measured income poverty rates for the six common countries are completely unrelated 
between these two studies (which use the bottom quintile of the overall income 
distribution as a measure of income poverty).   
The remaining studies define income poverty as having an income below half of 
the population average income.  This measure is more robust with respect to changes in 
the shape of the overall income distribution than the bottom-quintile measure.  For 
example, a higher proportion in the bottom quintile of a more equal income distribution 
might generate higher measured poverty.  However, this might mean that pensioners are 
relatively better off than their counterparts in a country with a more dispersed distribution 
of income.  The final difference is in the average used.  Hauser (1997) uses the mean while 
others use the median.  The mean, of course, leaves the results vulnerable to the effect of 
outliers and measurement error and produces a higher threshold in countries with a more 
dispersed overall income distribution.   
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Figure 6.  Pensioner income-poverty rates in 18 countries: percentage of 
pensioners with incomes below half population median 
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Source: Smeeding and Williamson (2001), Table 1 
Note data are from 1994 and 1995, with the exceptions of Canada and the United States 
(1997), Belgium, Japan, Switzerland, Denmark (1992) and Spain (1990) 
 
Figure 7.  Pensioner income-poverty rates in 19 countries: percentage of 
pensioner couples with incomes below half population median 
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Source: Förster and Pellizzari (2000), Table 5.4 
Note: data are from 1994 and 1995, with the exception of Austria and Italy (1993) and 
Hungary (1997) 
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Figure 6 is based on the latest published analysis of the Luxembourg Income Study 
database.  Averaging across the 18 countries shown, 11.4 per cent of older people have 
incomes below half the median.  The income-poverty rate varies from less than three per 
cent in Sweden to nearly 30 per cent in Australia.  
Figure 7 uses the results of the latest OECD study of income distribution.  The 
average income-poverty rate in this case is 13.9 per cent.  These two studies produce quite 
similar results.  The correlation between these two sets of results is close (0.76, significance 
level 0.00: see Table 5).  The largest difference is in the poverty rate for Australia, which is 
reported as 16.1 per cent by Förster and Pellizzari and 29.4 per cent by Smeeding and 
Williamson.   
 An income-poverty threshold of half-average income has become something of a 
standard, but the relative position of different countries can be sensitive to the choice of 
poverty line.  Many studies, recognizing this, provide results with different cut-off points.  
Comparison of these analyses is unfortunately hampered by the use of different thresholds: 
for example,  
• Smeeding and Williamson (2001) use 40 and 50 per cent; 
• Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995) use 50 and 70 per cent; and 
• Hauser (1997) and Whiteford and Kennedy (1995) use 40, 50 and 60 per cent. 
We use Hauser’s results as an illustration (Figure 8).  Naturally, a higher threshold increases 
measured poverty.  An average of six per cent of pensioners have incomes under 40 per 
cent of the population average, 13 per cent are under the 50-per-cent threshold and 24 per 
cent count as poor with a 60-per-cent poverty line.  Note that countries are ranked by their 
poverty rates with a 40-per-cent cut-off.   
There are re-rankings in countries’ relative poverty rates with different poverty 
lines.  In the United Kingdom, nine per cent of pensioners have incomes below 40 per cent 
of average, the fifth highest proportion.  However, with a 60-per-cent threshold, the 
United Kingdom has the highest measured elderly poverty rate (at 40 per cent).  Similarly, 
Denmark has the second lowest poverty rate with the lowest threshold but moves up six 
places with the highest poverty line.  Conversely, the United States has the third highest 
poverty rate with a 40-per-cent threshold, falling to fourth highest (50 per cent) and fifth 
highest (60 per cent).  Whiteford and Kennedy (1995) report similar results, again using 
data from the Luxembourg Income Study.  The United Kingdom has the third and fourth 
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lowest pensioner poverty rate with a cut-off of 40 and 50 per cent respectively.  However, 
if poverty is defined as an income below 60 per cent of the average, then the United 
Kingdom slips to eighth place.  
 The overall sensitivity of the results to the choice of poverty line tends to be quite 
small.  In Hauser’s study, for example, the correlation coefficients between results at the 
three different thresholds vary between 0.88 and 0.98, with significance levels of zero to 
four decimal places.  Whiteford and Kennedy’s results give correlation coefficients of 
between 0.51 and 0.91, implying a significant difference between the 40 and 60 per cent 
thresholds (p=0.1050).   
 
Figure 8.  Pensioner income poverty rates in 14 countries: proportion of 
pensioners with incomes below specified proportions of population mean 
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Source: Hauser (1997), Table 7 
Note data are from between 1989 and 1992, with the exception of Greece (1987-88) 
 
 
 Finally, Table 5 compares the cross-country correlations of poverty rankings over 
pair-wise comparisons for the six studies that define poverty as having an income below 
half the average that were presented in the charts above.  Five of these analyses are based 
on the Luxembourg Income Study, the exception being Förster and Pellizzari (2000).   
In general, the six papers give similar results.  The correlation coefficients for 
poverty rate rankings across countries are positive and relatively high: some are significant 
on standard tests.  Moreover, mean poverty rates in the countries that change rankings tend 
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to be similar.  The income-poverty rate in the United States lies between 20.3 and 25.3 per 
cent in different studies, but other countries show much more variation.   
Most significant is the United Kingdom.  Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding and 
Whiteford and Kennedy report one of the lowest poverty rates for the United Kingdom: 
the third and fourth lowest respectively (at seven and eight per cent).  In contrast, 
Bradshaw and Chen and Hauser suggest a very high poverty rate among British pensioners 
(36 and 23 per cent respectively).  In the former case, we suspect that the main reason for 
this result is the exclusion of housing benefit from the measure of income. (The authors 
are not transparent, but they state on page four: ‘Excluded from consideration here are the 
impacts of housing benefits and subsidies…’)  This treatment is unique to the Bradshaw-
Chen study; all the other papers surveyed define income as all cash income and ‘near-cash’ 
income, where the latter specifically includes, for example, housing benefit in the United 
Kingdom and food stamps in the United States.  Given the importance of housing benefits 
to poorer pensioners in the United Kingdom — some 17 per cent of all pensioners receive 
the benefit — it is unsurprising that this treatment has a significant effect on measured 
poverty rates.   
The main idiosyncrasy of the Hauser paper is in the definition of a pensioner: all 
members (irrespective of their own age) of households headed by someone aged 55 or over 
in which one or more member receives a pension.  The other studies simply count people 
as elderly using a standard cut-off age and do not count other members of households that 
contain a pensioner.  There are many different effects of this treatment and so it is difficult 
to isolate which might be responsible for the rather different result for the United 
Kingdom.   
 There are two other countries where there are substantial differences between the 
studies.  For Australia, Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding and Förster and Pellizzari find 
percentage poverty rates in the high teens, while the other three papers that cover Australia 
report figures of around 30 per cent.  The reported income-poverty rate for Norway varies 
between 7 and 19 per cent in four studies.   
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Table 5.  Comparison matrix for poverty rates: proportion of pensioners with incomes below half average 
 Bradshaw/Chen Förster/Pellizzari Hauser Smeeding/Williamson Whiteford/Kennedy 
Atkinson 
et al. 
Correlation: 0.30 (0.37) 
Means: 11, 15 
Observations: 11 
US: 21,25 
Correlation: 0.71 (0.00) 
Means: 11,11 
Observations: 13 
US: 21,20 
Correlation: 0.49 (0.15) 
Means: 10,12 
Observations: 10 
US: 21,21 
Correlation: 0.72 (0.01) 
Means: 11, 11 
Observations: 13 
US: 21,21 
Correlation: 0.94 (0.00) 
Means: 11,12 
Observations: 11 
US: 21,25 
      
Bradshaw/ 
Chen 
 Correlation: 0.46 (0.13) 
Means: 14,11 
Observations: 12 
US: 25,20 
Correlation: 0.64 (0.05) 
Means: 15,13 
Observations: 10 
US: 25,21 
Correlation: 0.69 (0.01) 
Means: 14, 12 
Observations: 13 
US: 25,21 
Correlation: 0.56 (0.12) 
Means: 16,13 
Observations: 9 
US: 25,25 
      
Förster/ 
Pellizzari 
  Correlation: 0.69 (0.02) 
Means: 13,12 
Observations: 11 
US: 20,21 
Correlation: 0.76 (0.00) 
Means: 11,2 
Observations: 13 
US: 20,21 
Correlation: 0.74 (0.01) 
Means: 11,12 
Observations: 10 
US: 20,25 
      
Hauser    Correlation: 0.71 (0.01) 
Means: 12,11 
Observations: 11 
US: 21,21 
Correlation: 0.52 (0.15) 
Means: 12,11 
Observations: 9 
US: 21,25 
      
Smeeding/ 
Williamson 
    Correlation: 0.87 (0.00) 
Means: 12,12 
Observations: 11 
US: 21,25 
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3. Income-poverty shares 
 A second, complementary presentation of income-poverty data looks at the 
proportion of the poor who are elderly, rather than the proportion of older people who are 
poor (as in the income-poverty rates above).  The pensioner poverty share is closely related 
to the pensioner poverty rate, but it also depends on the older people’s share of the 
population as a whole and on the overall poverty rate.   
 From the four studies surveyed here that report measures of poverty shares, we 
present detailed results from the most recent — Förster and Pellizzari (2000) — in 
Figure 9.  Poverty shares, like poverty rates, are highly variable between countries, from 
under three per cent in Canada to over 35 per cent in Norway.  The mean is just under 18 
per cent.    
 
Figure 9.  Pensioner income poverty shares in 16 countries: pensioners as 
a percentage of people with incomes below half population average 
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Source: Förster and Pellizzari (2000), Table 5.4 
Note: data are from 1994 and 1995, with the exception of Italy (1993) 
 
 
 The poverty share correlates well with the poverty rate from the same study 
(correlation coefficient: 0.68, significance: 0.00).  Nevertheless, there are some outliers.  
The United States has a high pensioner poverty rate relative to its pensioner poverty share, 
reflecting the relatively high overall poverty rate.  Denmark has the opposite: quite a low 
pensioner poverty rate but a high pensioner poverty share.  This reflects both a low overall 
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poverty rate and the high pensioner population share (15.6 per cent, compared with an 
average of 13 per cent for all the countries).   
 Table 6 shows limited correspondence between the different studies.  Förster and 
Pellizzari report a lower overall average poverty share than the other studies.  Bradshaw 
and Chen again report a very different figure for the United Kingdom than other studies 
(41 per cent compared with 15 and 17 per cent), for the reasons outlined above.  The 
results are fairly consistent between different studies for Australia, Belgium and Canada, 
but vary substantially for other countries.   
 
Table 6.  Comparison matrix for poverty shares: pensioners as a 
percentage of the population with incomes under half average 
 Bradshaw/Chen Burniaux et al. Förster/Pellizzari 
Atkinson 
et al. 
Correlation: 0.39 (0.27) 
Means: 25,25 
Observations: 10 
US: 22,23 
Correlation: 0.06 (0.89) 
Means: 24,22 
Observations: 8 
US: 22,14 
Correlation: 0.58 (0.05)  
Means: 24,17 
Observations: 12 
US: 22,14 
    
Bradshaw/ 
Chen 
 Correlation: 0.27 (0.48) 
Means: 24,26 
Observations: 9 
US: 23,14 
Correlation: 0.44 (0.15) 
Means: 25,16 
Observations: 12 
US: 23,14 
    
Burniaux 
et al. 
  Correlation: 0.49 (0.15) 
Means: 25,17 
Observations: 10 
US: 14,14 
 
 
 
4. Income trends 
 The previous sections provide ‘snapshots’ of pensioners’ incomes across countries 
in a single year.  We can extend the analysis to look at how these patterns have changed 
over time.  Förster and Pellizzari (2000) provide a broad analysis of the trend in the relative 
incomes of older people.  The data compare the mid-1990s with the mid-1980s.  Table 7 
gives the results as the percentage change in the replacement rate over the decade or so.  
Pensioners’ incomes increased faster than the whole population’s did in nine of the 13 
countries.  The mean change is a two per cent increase in the replacement rate.  Older 
people in Canada, France, Germany and the United Kingdom enjoyed large gains with 
increases of over five per cent in the replacement rate.  The sizeable decline in pensioners’ 
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relative incomes in Ireland is probably a reflection of the rapid growth of the economy, 
which has seen large increases in earnings.   
 
Table 7.  Percentage change in replacement rate by age group between the 
mid-1980s and the mid-1990s in 13 countries 
 Change in replacement rate (%)
 All Age 65-74 Age 75- 
Canada 6.0 8.5 0.7 
Denmark 4.0 6.5 1.4 
Finland 1.5 1.7 1.1 
France 6.3 8.6 1.4 
Germany 5.5 8.9 1.2 
Greece -2.9 -5.7 0.0 
Ireland -6.9 -9.2 1.4 
Italy 3.0 3.6 1.9 
Netherlands -1.8 -2.9 0.8 
Norway 4.3 8.6 2.3 
Sweden 3.9 6.4 -1.6 
United Kingdom 5.4 8.0 1.0 
United States -0.7 -0.3 0.9 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Förster and Pellizzari (2000), Table 2.3 
Note: absolute percentage point changes in the replacement rate have been transformed to 
(relative) percentage changes.  Data for all pensioners derived from results disaggregated by 
age using 1990s levels and 1980s-to-1990s changes in population shares to provide the 
relevant weights 
 
 
 Income changes in virtually all the countries vary significantly between the two age 
groups of ‘younger’ and ‘older’ pensioners.  In nine of the 13 nations, gains are larger for 
younger pensioners than for the over 75s; in several countries significantly so.  This may 
arise from the growth of private benefits, real wage growth (affecting incremental 
replacement rates) and other cohort effects.   
 
 
5. Income-distribution outcomes and the structure pension systems 
We began the paper by observing that industrialized countries have very different 
pension systems.  We have then shown that there is much less variation in 
retirement-income outcomes than such structural differences might imply.  The OECD 
(2001) has described this result as ‘convergent outcomes, divergent means’.   
 Figure 10 projects statutory pension values for people with different earnings levels 
based on today’s rules.  The charts look at full-career workers earning various proportions 
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of the economy-wide average: half, average, one-and-a-half times and twice mean pay.  The 
vertical axis shows the corresponding individual pension value as a percentage of economy-
wide average earnings.   
In Italy, the public pension scheme has a high ceiling.  It is designed to achieve a 
great degree of earnings replacement, even for high-income workers.  A similar effect is 
achieved by the statutory occupational pension system in Finland and the quasi-mandatory 
occupational schemes in the Netherlands and Sweden.  The Dutch and Finnish systems 
have no ceiling to benefits; in Sweden, the ceiling is very high.  Korea’s severance pay 
scheme also has no ceiling.  In these countries, there is some additional protection for low-
income workers, but over much of the income range, projected pension values are linear.   
At the other end of the spectrum, the philosophy of the Canadian and British 
systems is very different.  These systems are more redistributive.  They ensure that all 
pensioners achieve a basic standard of living rather than aiming to give everyone a certain 
level of earnings replacement.  This has led to development of extensive voluntary private 
coverage, particularly among higher-income workers.  Both countries have mandatory 
earnings-related public schemes, but these have low ceilings and relatively low accrual rates.   
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Figure 10.  Projected pension values as a proportion of economy-wide 
earnings for workers earning between one half and twice average 
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 France and Spain look similar to the first group of countries (over this income 
range, at least).  Their pension systems are focused on an insurance objective, but ceilings 
are lower than they are in the countries in the first panel of the Figure.   
 Six countries make up an intermediate group.  In Germany and the United States, 
the public pension systems have a redistributive formula, giving higher replacement rates to 
lower-income workers.  Australia and Switzerland have systems of mandatory contributions 
to private pension plans at quite low levels along with sizeable basic pension programs.  
The two-tier Japanese public scheme is similarly redistributive.  
The reason why these substantially different statutory pension systems deliver 
similar outcomes lies in voluntary provision of retirement incomes.  In particular, the more 
redistributive public schemes leave space for the development of private plans for middle- 
and high-income workers.  This is illustrated in Figure 11, which shows the proportion of 
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income deriving from the state (pensions and other benefits).  Countries are ranked by the 
overall average proportion of older people’s income from state sources.  Unsurprisingly, 
poorer pensioners everywhere rely on the state for the vast majority of their income.  The 
comprehensive social-insurance schemes in France, Germany and Italy mean that the 
richest pensioners still get the majority of their income from the state.  Indeed, the 
proportion in France and Italy is only slightly below the proportion for the bottom income 
quintile.  In the other countries, there are predominantly flat-rate public pension systems, 
or earnings-related public schemes with highly progressive formulae.  In Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the United States, only around a fifth of the income of the richest 
quintile of the elderly derives from public pension programs.   
 These results — confirmed by other studies, such as Disney, Mira d’Ercole and 
Scherer (1998), Börsch-Supan (1997) and OECD (2001) — show the substitutabilty of 
publicly provided benefits and private sources of retirement support.   
 
Figure 11.  Percentage of pensioners’ income from public pensions and 
other state benefits by quintile of the income distribution, nine countries 
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Source: Disney and Johnson (2001), Table [xx] 
 
 
 
6. Income concepts 
 The data underlying the results surveyed here are based on similar concepts of 
income.  This comprises earnings, public transfers, investment incomes, private pensions 
etc.  Typically, the studies exclude all (or at least some kinds of) capital gains, because the 
receipt of a capital gain in a particular period reflects the accrual of gains over the period an 
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asset was held.  Including such gains would artificially broaden the income distribution.  
Incomes in kind are also excluded, as are lump-sum distributions from private pensions.  
This raises significant questions concerning the definition of economic well-being 
and, in particular, the treatment of financial assets and housing wealth.  This is particularly 
pertinent for pensioners who are (or should be, according to the standard lifecycle 
hypothesis of consumption) dis-saving at this point in their life.    
 
6.1 Capital income and financial wealth 
 The standard ‘statistical’ measure of income used in distributional analyses differs 
from a desirable ‘economic’ measure.  The Haig-Simons (economic) definition is the 
change in net economic wealth between two points in time plus consumption in that 
period.  Hicks (1946) defines income as ‘the maximum amount of money which the 
individual can spend this week, and still expect to be able to spend the same amount in real 
terms in each ensuing week’.  The difference between the two relates to non-recurring 
sources of income.   
The standard statistical measure is an approximation to the economic definition, 
but it differs in two important respects.  First, it ignores capital gains.  Secondly, it does not 
take account of the effect of inflation.  It makes little sense to say that income is the 
amount one can spend in a period leaving the nominal rather than the real value of wealth 
intact.  Yet, the standard measure typically includes nominal capital income.   
To illustrate, pensioners’ investment incomes fell by nearly a fifth between 1992 
and 1994-95.  But during this period, interest rates fell from 15 per cent to less than half 
that level and inflation fell from a peak of nearly 11 per cent to less than three per cent, 
leaving real interest rates fairly stable.  This implies that the measured decline in the level of 
investment incomes overstates the change in economic income according to the Hicksian 
criterion.  It would not be possible to spend nominal interest income without reducing the 
real value of wealth.  There are similar distortions in comparisons between countries with 
different inflation rates.   
The Hicksian definition has one undesirable characteristic: it assumes that people’s 
command over resources is limited such that the current stock of wealth is left when they 
die.  (The Hicksian definition underlies the permanent income hypothesis of consumption 
and saving behavior, which explicitly assumes that people have infinite lives.)  However, it 
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is reasonable to suggest that pensioners might finance some of their consumption from 
running down their wealth.  This process is automatic in pension schemes that provide 
annuities (that is, all public and most private plans).  The payment stops when the 
beneficiaries die and net wealth in the scheme is then obviously zero.  
Most other assets, however, are not in the form of annuities, and it may be that the 
decision to hold part of wealth not in the form of annuities arises from some form of 
bequest motive.  Nevertheless, the stock of wealth represents command over resources 
that a pensioner could spend if she or he so wanted.  Moreover, if bequests are altruistic, 
then presumably elderly donors derive some utility from the knowledge that their pet 
charity or relative will benefit after they have passed on.  If bequests are strategic, then 
pensioners enjoy some non-pecuniary return (Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985).  
 This invites a comprehensive measure of command over resources that asks: ‘how 
much can people safely spend in a period and expect to have net wealth of zero when they 
die?’  More formally, this measure can be defined as the sum of non-capital income plus 
initial period wealth times the annuity rate.  To examine how this affects income at each 
age, we utilize age and sex-specific annuity rates to construct an annuity value of wealth 
(see Disney and Whitehouse, 2001, pp. 75-78 for full details).  Data on average holdings of 
financial assets from a number of countries are drawn from Disney, Mira d’Ercole and 
Scherer (1998).   
Table 8 shows wealth as a ratio to income in the first four columns, split by marital 
type and between pensioners and older workers.  Among the pensioner units, the wealth-
to-income ratio is the highest in Australia: single pensioners have assets worth over six 
times their income; couples, five times.  The average across all the countries shown is 
around 2.5 for both single pensioners and couples, with Japan and the United States also 
showing high levels of wealth relative to income.  The final two columns indicate the effect 
of including the annuity value of wealth in the income measure.  This increase at age 67 is 
the annuity rate at that age (7.8 per cent) less the return on assets already counted as 
income (which we have arbitrarily taken as five per cent).  The average change is a seven 
per cent increase in pensioners’ command over resources, with significant variation 
between countries.  For example, Australia has a relatively low pension replacement rate 
but high wealth-to-income ratios, so a broader concept of command over resources puts it 
closer to other countries.  Partly because of fiscal incentives and partly for historical and 
cultural reasons, most occupational pensions in Australia are drawn as lump sums rather 
than an annuity.  Australian pensioners clearly must finance their consumption by running 
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down their assets: a form of self-provision of an annuity.  Compare this with another 
country, the United Kingdom, say, where most occupational-pension benefits have to be 
taken as an annuity.  Income would be higher and asset holdings lower on standard 
measures even if the economic position of older people in the two countries were the 
same.  The measure of comprehensive command over resources equalizes the treatment of 
these two different systems of pension provision.  Crystal and Shea (1990) performed a 
similar exercise on United States data, which showed an increase in the measured 
replacement rate for older people from 103 to 124 per cent once the annuity value of 
wealth was taken into account. 
 
Table 8.  Financial wealth as a proportion of income and effect on income 
from annuitization 
 Wealth/income ratio  Increase in 
 Age 55 Age 67  income 
Australia 2.1 5  14% 
France 1.5 3.7  10% 
Germany 0.5 1.2  3% 
Italy 1.3 2.8  8% 
Japan 1.7 3.8  11% 
Netherlands 0.4 0.9  3% 
Sweden -0.1 0.7  2% 
United Kingdom 0.7 1.3  4% 
United States 1.5 3.2  9% 
Source: Disney, Mira d’Ercole and Scherer (1998), Table 9 
Note: data are from between 1992 and 1995, with the exceptions of the United Kingdom 
(1988-89) and the Netherlands (1990) 
 
 
 
6.2 Housing 
 Many pensioners have a far more valuable asset than their financial wealth in the 
shape of their own home.  Indeed, for many older households housing wealth is the major 
asset other than social-security or private-pension wealth.  Owner occupation yields a flow 
of services that should, in principle, be treated as an income flow, usually called an 
‘imputed rent’.   
Table 9 shows the extent of home ownership by income across a number of 
countries.  Owner-occupation rates are very high in Australia and the United States and 
high in Canada, France and the United Kingdom.  Elsewhere in Europe, they are 
significantly lower, especially in the Netherlands.  In addition, many home-owners still have 
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a mortgage on their property in Germany and the Netherlands.  To the extent that housing 
wealth represents an additional implicit annuity stream, pensioners in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries are better off than income-based calculations would imply.   
 
Table 9.  Pensioners’ housing tenure by income quintile 
in eight countries 
 Bottom quintile Middle quintile Top quintile 
 Rent Mortgage Own Rent Mortgage Own Rent Mortgage Own 
Australia 20 2 78 21 4 75 13 6 81 
Canada 42 9 50 23 10 66 21 8 71 
France 34 3 62 38 5 57 21 7 72 
Germany 63 5 32 64 7 29 37 21 42 
Italy 35 4 62 36 3 61 34 3 63 
Netherlands 57 11 33 81 7 12 47 26 26 
United Kingdom 46 4 50 47 5 48 10 15 75 
United States 30 70 15 85 10 90 
Note: ‘own’ means owned outright except in the United States where it is not possible to 
separate people who own their home outright from people with a mortgage 
Source: Disney and Johnson (2001); authors’ tabulations of British Household Panel Survey 
 
 
 Table 10 shows estimates of the value of housing wealth relative to income in a 
range of countries.  Housing wealth is generally much larger for people over retirement age 
than it is for people of working age.  High property prices in Japan and the value placed on 
home ownership mean that housing wealth is particularly significant there.   
 The ‘asset-rich, income-poor’ phenomenon that has exercised some commentators 
seems particularly pertinent with housing wealth, especially where the tax (and means-test) 
treatment of retirement-income streams invites individuals to hold their assets in the form 
of housing.  Nevertheless, there are difficulties in simply treating housing as wealth that 
could be potentially annuitised.  Housing is also a consumption good and pensioners are 
often reluctant to move from their family home (Venti and Wise, 1990; Megbolugbe, 
Sa-Aadu and Shilling, 1999). Housing wealth may prove a constraint on current living 
standards rather than simply a source of additional imputed income. 
 Nevertheless, it would be useful to know what is the annuity value of this housing 
wealth, and how its use would affect the incomes of pensioners and the poverty rates 
among pensioner households.  Hancock (1998) provides an illuminating account of this in 
the United Kingdom. Her calculations suggest that the proportion of pensioners (home-
owning pensioners) that would gain at least £130 a year from annuitisation of housing 
wealth rises with age: from 18 per cent (28 per cent) of single men aged 65 or over, to 28 
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per cent (45 per cent) of single men aged 70 or over and to 44 per cent  (75 per cent) of 
single men aged 75 or over.  This is simply because the annuity rate increases with age. 
However, converting housing equity into an annuity implies the existence of a competitive 
and secure equity-release sector.  But this market has remained rather thin in both the 
United Kingdom and elsewhere.   
 The most common form of equity release practised by older households is 
therefore through downsizing and changes in tenure status. A number of studies have 
examined the relationship between house moves and ‘excess’ housing costs, measured in 
either physical units or monetary terms.  The presumption is that moves are more likely 
where the house is ‘inappropriate’ to the size of the family or when there are changes in 
economic status (such as retirement). 
 
Table 10.  Mean housing wealth to income ratios in eight countries, 
mid-1990s 
 Under retirement 
age 
Over retirement 
age 
Finland 2.1 3.2 
Germany 2.8 4.5 
Italy 2.1 3.0 
Japan 4.2 8.9 
Netherlands 1.2 1.6 
Sweden 2.1 1.7 
United Kingdom 2.6 3.9 
United States 1.5 3.0 
Source: OECD (2001), Table 2.6 
 
 
The results of these studies are mixed.  Ermisch and Jenkins (1999) find some 
evidence that retired people in the United Kingdom who move do physically reduce their 
living space.  Evidence from the United States shows that some households move to 
rented accommodation after retirement as a way of releasing housing equity for 
consumption (see, for example, Feinstein and McFadden, 1989).  But in the United 
Kingdom, more older households switched from rental to owner occupation than made the 
reverse move in the late 1980s, perhaps because of ‘right-to-buy’ policies in local authority 
housing.  Moreover, Disney, Henley and Stears (2002) find no evidence that ‘excess’ 
housing budget shares, relative to income, were associated with household moves in the 
late 1980s.  This was perhaps because this was a period of falling house prices that induced 
elderly households to ‘sit tight’.  However, that paper does show that moving by elderly 
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households was associated with an increase in financial assets, indicating some evidence of 
‘equity release’ as a motive for moving.   
Cross-country comparisons of the value of housing equity (Smeeding et al., 1993; 
Whiteford and Kennedy, 1995) suffer from two main problems.  First, they combine the 
value of direct subsidies to social rented housing with the value of home-owners’ equity.  
Although both of these relate to housing, they are very different economic issues.  
Secondly, the data are far from ideal.  In most cases, the value of housing equity has to be 
imputed from a different dataset and matched into the Luxembourg Income Study by age 
and income.  People are then simply assumed to earn a fixed rate of return on the value of 
housing equity.  
Housing wealth is an important determinant of the standard of living for many 
older households: its use, for example, could reduce significantly measured poverty among 
very elderly households outside the poorest quintile.  Nevertheless, the equity-release 
market is thin.  The evidence that pensioner households use house moves to release equity 
is strong, but many elderly households are reluctant to move at all, even when they have 
high potential values of housing equity.  Large houses (relative to income) are both a 
blessing and a curse. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 This paper has surveyed the results of a dozen recent papers on the relative living 
standards of older people in a number of OECD countries.  The main findings are: 
• Average pensioner incomes range from 73 per cent of average population incomes in 
Denmark to over 90 per cent in Canada and the United States (the ‘replacement rate’).  
Allowing for travel-to-work and other costs, and adjusting for differences in family size 
and composition, pensioners probably have a similar standard of living to their younger 
counterparts. 
• Single women pensioners tend to be worse off than couples, especially if they live 
alone.  Living arrangements differ widely. 
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• Younger pensioners generally have higher incomes than older pensioners, except in 
Australia, where the age pension is means-tested and private pensions are mostly taken 
as lump sums. 
• Correlations of cross country rankings of replacement ratios across countries show 
positive, but not always significant coefficients.  Different data sets, methodologies and 
time periods give different results. 
• There is disagreement across studies as to what fraction of pensioners are ‘poor’, and 
how these rankings differ across countries.  The rankings are sensitive to where the 
poverty line is set.  Another important determinant of the poverty rate is the degree of 
inequality of incomes of the working population. 
• Replacement rates for pensioners increased between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s 
in most countries, with younger pensioners faring better than older pensioners.  Again, 
however, several countries go against the trend. 
• ‘Income’ in these studies typically comprises income from earnings, pensions (both 
public and private) and investment income.  But many pensioners have other forms of 
wealth, notably financial and housing wealth.  Pensioner households can spend more 
than they receive by drawing down (‘annuitizing’) this wealth. 
• Many older households, however, do not run down their wealth, either by choice (for 
example, a bequest motive) or because it is illiquid (home ownership).  Should the 
annuity value of this wealth be added to measured income in assessing pensioner well-
being?  We illustrated the range of impacts to measured income that arise from 
incorporating the annuitised value of wealth into the calculations and discussed some 
practical issues that arise when pensioner households try to adopt such a strategy. 
Future work might exploit data sets that track individuals over time.  At present, 
few studies consider whether pensioner poverty is persistent, although longitudinal data sets 
such as the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) and AHEAD are increasingly been used 
for this purpose in the United States.  Such data sets are expensive to collect and assimilate, 
and European countries have been slow to follow the American lead.  However the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) offers data collected on a comparable 
basis for a range of EU countries that has not been exploited to a great extent (Nicoletti 
and Peracchi, 2001).    
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A potentially exciting innovation arises from panel studies that are being developed 
or already ‘in the field’ that collected data both on the economic and health status of panels 
of households close to or after retirement age.  Surveys such as the English Longitudinal 
Survey of Ageing (ELSA) and the Survey of Health and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) 
are now underway.  These studies, closely matching HRS and AHEAD in the US, should 
permit more sophisticated comparable analyses of the dynamic determinants of well-being 
of older people, matching economic measures of ‘well-being’ to underlying measures of 
morbidity, disability and general health.  The goals of greater understanding of the 
evolution of well-being of older households, and the potential for genuinely 
interdisciplinary research, will be greatly enhanced by these developments.  
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